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A knowledge network for a dynamic 
taxonomy of psychiatric disease 
Ranga R. Krishnan, MB,ChB
Current taxonomic approaches in medicine and psy-
chiatry are limited in validity and utility. They do serve 
simple communication purposes for medical cod-
ing, teaching, and reimbursement, but they are not 
suited for the modern era with its rapid explosion of 
knowledge from the “omics” revolution. The National 
Academy of Sciences published a report entitled To-
ward Precision Medicine: Building a Knowledge Net-
work for Biomedical Research and a New Taxonomy of 
Disease. The authors advocate a new taxonomy that 
would integrate molecular data, clinical data, and 
health outcomes in a dynamic, iterative fashion, bring-
ing together research, public health, and health-care 
delivery with the interlinked goals of advancing our 
understanding of disease pathogenesis and thereby 
improving health. As the need for an information hub 
and a knowledge network with a dynamic taxonomy 
based on integration of clinical and research data is vi-
tal, and timely, this proposal merits consideration.    
© 2015, AICH – Servier Research Group Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2015;17:79-87.
Introduction
 Disease is a fluid concept influenced by social 
and political attitudes and research that changes with 
time and in reaction to new scientific developments.1 
There are numerous definitions of disease, but one con-
crete and comprehensible definition is to consider dis-
ease as a state that places individuals at increased risk 
of adverse consequences.2
 Linnaeus, the famous classifier, attempted a simple 
classification of disease that focused on fever.3 This ef-
fort was the original precursor to the current standard 
classification of diseases and related health problems 
that uses the standard diagnostic tool called the Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases (ICD), now in its 11th 
edition). Today, the ICD remains the most widely used 
system of classification.4 
 Taxonomies, in medicine, underpin medical teach-
ing, organization, and reimbursement—they are the 
language of modern health care and medicine. 
 The current system attempts to balance the need 
for consistent terminology to ensure clear communica-
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tion with integration of advances in knowledge. These 
disease classification systems are limited in their util-
ity, information content, and usability. They are based 
on symptoms, physical signs, pathology, and occasion-
ally, some laboratory and radiological findings.1 A spe-
cific disease denotes the sum of abnormal features (eg, 
symptoms, signs, laboratory findings, etc) that have 
been shown in a group to differ from the standard nor-
mal features of the population in a manner that places 
them at risk of adverse outcome. Norms are established 
by studying relevant populations, divergences from the 
norm, and subsequent risks may or may not need for-
mal statistics. Adverse consequences include physical 
morbidity, mortality, and psychological impairment, and 
limitations in activity.1
 Current nosological systems are not designed to 
predict treatment or prognosis other than in a broad 
and unrefined fashion.1 They are not adaptive in their 
ability to rapidly assimilate the overwhelming deluge 
of molecular data, treatment responses, and social en-
vironmental information.5 These taxonomies are hier-
archical, segmented, and linear, which leads to an arti-
ficial rigidity. It impedes characterization and linkages 
between and across differently labeled entities.5 The 
introduction of molecular medicine is rapidly highlight-
ing these limitations. 
Single gene, many diseases
First, individual mutations in genes underlie a plethora 
of expressions of what, on the surface, are markedly dis-
tinct diseases. Retinoblastoma, a cancer of the retina, 
which chiefly affects children, is caused by mutations in 
the Rb gene.6 However, not all people who carry this 
mutation develop retinoblastoma. For instance, two sib-
lings could inherit the same mutation of the gene from 
their parents, and one might be affected by the disease, 
while the other is not. This reflects penetrance.7
 Neurofibromatosis is another disease with a similar 
pattern, where a mutation in neurofibromin gene can 
lead to the disease in some, but not others.8
Multiple mutations in several genes with 
similar clinical features
The Cancer Genome Atlas, funded by the National In-
stitutes of Health, shows that a specific cancer, such as 
breast cancer, can be caused by different mutations. 
Knowledge of these mutations can, in certain instances, 
enable the prediction of treatment response and help 
identify potential new treatments. However, what is 
striking is that the same mutations can be involved in 
what, nominally and even pathologically, looked to be 
very different type of cancers. One of the mutations in 
a gene called V-RAF Murine Sarcoma Viral Oncogene 
Homolog B1 (BRAF) highlights the challenge current 
classification systems are facing.9
 The BRAF mutation is linked to more than half of 
all melanoma cases; 7% of certain lung cancer tumors, 
4% of colon cancer malignancies, and to a lesser extent, 
brain, bladder, head-and-neck, kidney, and ovarian can-
cers.10 The same gene is linked to many ostensibly differ-
ent types of cancers. The classification systems are clearly 
turning out to be less than adequate. There is, therefore, 
a need for more dynamic and updateable systems.
Where are we in psychiatry?
In psychiatry, the broadly used system called the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) for psychiatric diseases is now in its 5th itera-
tion.11 The DSM system works for simple coding and 
reimbursement purposes, but is not designed to facili-
tate the development and integration of biomedical 
knowledge. An alternative approach has been the Re-
search Domain Criteria (RDoC) system proposed and 
endorsed by the National Institute of Mental Health.11 
This multidimensional approach uses units of informa-
tion beyond clinical phenotypes, such as imaging, be-
havior, etc. Thus, a matrix is developed with constructs 
that can then be related to different elements of infor-
mation from imaging to genetics. The five domains with 
constructs include positive valence, negative valence, 
cognitive systems, arousal systems, and systems for so-
cial processes. These domains do not readily map to the 
widely used clinical constructs and also do not provide 
the ultimate reason to classify, which is to improve the 
lives of patients.12
 Today, clinical constructs are nominalist in nature as 
they are defined by a cluster of symptoms, signs, and 
their course. Even though the DSM states that “there 
is no assumption that each category of mental disorder 
is a completely discrete entity with absolute boundar-
ies dividing it from other mental disorders or from no 
mental disorder”11 the plain statement listing a diagnos-
tic concept in an official nomenclature and providing a 
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precise definition makes it appear concrete and distinct.
 In addition, once notions are stated in such a rigid 
form they tend to become codified and reified without 
an examination of the fundamental validity. How do we 
check for validity?
 Robins and Guze13 proposed strict criteria for defin-
ing the validity of psychiatric diagnoses. They enumer-
ated five criteria: (i) clinical description (symptoms); 
(ii) laboratory studies; (iii) demarcation from other 
disorders; (iv) follow-up studies of diagnostic stabil-
ity; and (iv) familial history consistent with the entity. 
However, almost none of the more than 300 entities in 
DSM meet these criteria. One of the requirements for 
symptom- and course-based identification and demar-
cation is to establish points of no overlap between simi-
lar syndromes. Attempts to determine natural borders 
even between what, on the surface, look like distinct 
syndromes, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, 
often have not been successful.14 The points of rarity 
between psychiatric diseases are not distinct. Trying to 
clearly separate individuals—to classify them as having 
a particular disease—leads to some individuals clearly 
falling within one group, but over time many move be-
tween groups and sometimes meet the criteria for more 
than one group. This leads to calling many conditions 
or entities simultaneously present or comorbid, which 
is a word that reflects the basic problem with the sys-
tem. Strauss et al indicated, in a sample of first admis-
sions to a psychiatric unit, that symptom constellations 
representative of the classic diagnostic groups (ie, ma-
nia, schizophrenia, neurotic depression, and psychotic 
depression) could be identified, but only a few patients 
resembled the prototype of these traditional descrip-
tions.15 Strauss et al stated that “These findings suggest 
that although syndromes do exist that fit traditional 
diagnostic categories, the vast majority of patients fall 
between these syndromes, having characteristics from 
several of them.”15
 Manton et al,16 Davidson et al,17 and our group de-
veloped a “grade of membership” model to address this 
issue by assigning individuals to diagnostic categories, 
while explicitly recognizing fuzzy boundaries allowing 
individuals to be partly assigned to more than one class. 
 As a result of these findings Kendell,18 Kendell and 
Gourlay,19 Kendell and Gourlay,20 Kendell and Brock-
ington,21 and others suggest that the concept of disease 
as a distinct entity in the psychiatric context is problem-
atic. 
 The search for foundations of this nominally based 
classification will be elusive. Let’s say we find that pa-
tients with depression have an abnormal test result, say 
a molecular anomaly; we can use these data to attempt 
to develop it as a test to identify specificity, sensitivity, 
etc. Now, let’s say that the test is for the presence of 
a mutation in a gene, and that mutation links not just 
to depression, but to anxiety, bipolar disorder, etc. This 
will be construed as a nonspecific test when that muta-
tion may be pointing to a cause for the illness. Then, a 
purely nominalist approach and use of the data, as a test 
for the nominalist disease, will be disadvantageous. It is 
likely to not change our practice or improve our under-
standing, and thus may  not lead to better identification 
of subjects and treatments.
 However, we are making progress by beginning 
to understand the biology and underlying cause(s) of 
some of these psychiatric diseases, and in many cases, 
just as in cancer, it is changing our underlying assump-
tions about the definition of some of these conditions.
Alzheimer’s disease
Let us take Alzheimer’s disease (AD). It is the most 
common form of dementia. The basic criteria in the cur-
rent, clinically used nosology emphasizes the age of on-
set, course outcome, and in some cases, the pathological 
and radiological criteria. However, the molecular basis 
of some types of AD is now delineated.
 A dominant pattern of inheritance is seen in most 
presenile cases and accounts for about one third of all 
cases of AD. Four genes have been identified. Many cas-
es of AD can be then classified based on its genetic origin 
(Figure 1). They include mutation(s) in the genes for am-
yloid precursor protein (APP),22 presenilin-1 (PSEN1),23 
and presenilin-2 (PSEN2),24 and can be associated with 
the apolipoprotein E*e4 (APOE*E4) allele on chromo-
some 19.25 Mutations in the APP gene have been associ-
ated with early-onset, cerebral amyloidosis of the Dutch 
type.26 In addition, some mutations have been associated 
with hemorrhagic strokes, occipital calcifications, and ar-
terial dysplasia. Individuals with PSEN mutations also 
have early-onset disease, and some have myoclonic jerks, 
spastic paresis, behavioral symptoms, and cerebral amy-
loid angiopathy.27 Patients with PSEN2 mutations also 
have early-onset dementia.28
 The most important genetic risk for AD is APOE. 
The APOE*E4 allele has been associated as a risk fac-
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tor for AD and cardiovascular disease. Unlike PSEN 
2 and APP mutations, the APOE*E4 allele confers a 
risk for both sporadic, including late-onset AD, and fa-
milial AD.25 The APOE*E4 allele is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the expression of AD, highlighting the 
importance of other environmental or genetic factors 
that, in combination with APOE*E4, increase the risk 
of AD. OMIM (Online Inheritance in Man), an online 
catalogue of human genes and genetic disorders, names 
this form of AD as AD2.
 Here research has changed and defined AD by sub-
typing based on molecular risk. This system is not cur-
rently used, as the subtyping does not yet have clini-
cal relevance. Nevertheless, it serves as an example of 
a nominalist entity now getting a biological basis and 
then being subtyped. In this case, the subtyping high-
lights clinical features that help differentiate the dif-
ferent diseases. So now, if one looks at AD, it can be 
described, or broken down, as shown in Figure 2. It is 
likely that it will be subtyped further as our knowledge 
increases.
Cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with 
subcortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy
Cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with sub-
cortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL) 
is a relatively rare autosomal dominant disease aris-
ing from mutations in a gene called NOTCH3 (Figure 
3).29 These mutations lead to small-vessel disease in 
the brain. Magnetic resonance imaging shows severe 
white-matter lesions and infarcts in deep white matter 
and subcortical regions of the brain. The disorder starts 
relatively young and patients usually present with mi-
graine, depression, memory impairment, and over time, 
they develop strokes and dementia. It is a form of pure 
vascular dementia, and is an example of an inherited 
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APP PSEN1 PSEN2 APOE 4 Unknown
Figure 2.  Genetic causes of Alzheimer’s disease with APP, PSEN1, and 
PSEN2 genes. APP, amyloid precursor protein; PSEN1, prese-
nilin-1; PSEN2, presenilin-2.
Figure 1.  Overlap between diagnostic categories. This overlap can oc-
cur at a particular moment in time or in the same patient at 
different times.
Figure 3.  Subtypes of Alzheimer’s disease with respect to APP, PSEN1, 
PSEN2, and ApoE genes. ApoE, apolipoprotein E; APP, amy-
loid precursor protein; PSEN1, presenilin-1; PSEN2, preseni-
lin-2.
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form of subcortical vascular disease.29 The disease has 
an estimated prevalence of 4 per 100 000 adults.
 As discussed regarding the field of cancer,, this is an 
example of mutations in a single gene leading to a range 
of clinical manifestations or disorders. Also, a single pa-
tient can have more than one manifestation at different 
times during the illness.29
Common forms of subcortical 
ischemic disease
We introduced the notion of a single gene leading to a 
vascular disease that affects the brain by producing a 
plethora of “psychiatric and neurological diseases,” but 
this form of vascular disease is very common. Subcorti-
cal ischemic disease (SID) and its labeling give an idea 
of the complexity of labeling neurological and psychi-
atric disorders and the challenges that lie ahead. Any 
proposal of diagnostic criteria claiming that a psychi-
atric disorder is due to a medical condition, should un-
dergo detailed scrutiny.30,31 SID is very common in the 
elderly. The risk factors are similar to that for stroke. 
They include hypertension, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, 
and smoking. SID, just as in the case of CADASIL, 
can present with, and lead to, numerous manifestations 
(Figure 4). 
 As noted in a publication by Post, the German psy-
chiatrist Gaupp described 45 elderly patients with de-
pression secondary to arteriosclerosis. Many had apathy 
and sadness.32 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has 
increased the detection of subtle, but surprisingly wide-
spread, structural brain changes in vivo. SID is a defin-
ing characteristic, just like coronary artery disease, and 
an expression of the disease could include depression. 
Mood disturbances associated with SID may meet the 
full criteria for major depression, bipolar disorder, or 
dysthymia, but are more likely to be less severe chronic 
mood disturbances that are associated with subcortical 
ischemia. Our current diagnostic nomenclature does 
not capture these other disturbances. Other manifesta-
tions of SID include cognitive impairment, dementia, 
falls, and psychoses.
 A subcategory of SID is subcortical ischemic vas-
cular dementia; this is similar to what we have previ-
ously called MRI-defined vascular depression.33-35 Does 
this syndrome meet the Robins and Guze definition 
of validity?12 SID has a clinical description and can be 
identified through MRI,36-38 can be delimited from other 
disorders by pathology, is not associated with familial 
factors for depression, and the pathological changes 
seen on MRI predict outcomes longitudinally.37,38
 SID is more common in depressed elderly subjects 
than in control subjects, and even more prevalent in 
late-onset elderly depressed subjects.39-45 These patients 
are, as expected, at higher risk of dying and developing 
dementia.46 There may also be a biological specificity 
by anatomical location, wherein SID’s contributions to 
depression occur in specific regions47-48 and worsening 
of ischemic disease is associated with poor depression 
outcomes.46 In this context, depression is part of a con-
tinuum of neuropsychiatric conditions associated with 
SID.49
 Only a small percentage of patients with psychiatric 
illness have clearly identifiable causes at this time. The 
vast majority have many intersecting and multiple risks 










Figure 4.  Clinical manifestations of cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL).
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 Therefore, this brings us to the vast majority of psy-
chiatric illnesses for which we do not have clearly iden-
tifiable causes. Even when there is a family history of 
illness, it is quite common that the features of the family 
illness are very different from each other; therefore, it is 
no surprise that attempts to link specific illnesses, clas-
sified in the nominalist tradition, to genetic factors have 
been, for the most part, unsuccessful. Recent studies 
are showing that even when links are observed, they cut 
across nominalist diagnostic categories such as autism, 
schizophrenia, attention deficit disorder, bipolar disor-
der, and major depression.
 Why should neuropsychiatric illness be any differ-
ent from cancers? Just as in cancer, it is likely that many 
genes are involved and the same gene mutation may 
manifest differently in patients. Some may have little 
or no symptoms, and others may have a whole range 
of symptoms that could fluctuate and evolve over time. 
Emerging work clearly points in this direction. 
 Autism is an example. In about 10% of patients, an 
identifiable genetic cause or chromosomal anomaly 
can be found.50 There are many genetic diseases linked 
to Fragile X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis, Angelman 
syndrome, Down syndrome, Sanfilippo syndrome, Rett 
syndrome and other MECP2-related disorders, phenyl-
ketonuria, Smith-Magenis syndrome, 22q13 deletion 
syndrome, Cohen syndrome, adenylosuccinate lyase de-
ficiency, and Smith-Lemli-Opitz syndrome.51 Each one of 
these diseases has very characteristic features and mani-
festations, with autism being just one of them. (Figure 5).
 In addition, a whole range of genes have been impli-
cated by genetic studies and a few are now considered 
to be validated by more than one study. Most of them in-
volve the glutamate system and/or brain development. 
These genes, along with a multitude of rare deletions, 
are believed to account for about 7% of patients with 
autism.52 Thus, just like in Alzheimer’s disease, there is 
increased genetic dissection. Imagine the complexity 
for taxonomy as more of autism is dissected, and maybe 
as many more causes are identified, each accounting for 
less than 0.1% of the whole pie.
 Although we have focused on genetic risk, there are 
many other factors external to the individual that can 
play a role in the development and evolution of a dis-
ease and response to treatment. In psychiatry, life stress, 
trauma in early childhood and social support are all well 
known to be critical in the development of psychiatric 
disorders. These are usually thought of as nonspecific 
risks. Another way to look at these ”nonspecific risks” 
are to consider them as an interacting risk that leads to 
different manifestations of the disorder depending on 
the genetics and life history of the patient (Figure 6). 
The exposome
The exposome concept has major implications for psy-
chiatry. The exposome is the sum of all factors to which 
an individual has been exposed which could relate to 
that individual’s health. These include diet, lifestyle, 
stress, occupational exposures, and social support from 
conception onward.53 The exposome clearly interacts 
with the individual and plays a role in the development 
of diseases. The concept of the exposome has not been 
widely considered in psychiatric illnesses, but it should 
be considered as an essential complement to the study 


















































Figure 6.  The many entities that can present with features of autism. 
Not all are shown. Note that each of them will have their 
own unique characteristics.Figure 5.  Clinical manifestations of subcortical ischemic disease (SID).
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Where do we go? 
Knowledge network for psychiatric taxonomy
It is clear from our description of where we currently 
are in psychiatric taxonomy that a static approach to 
classifying psychiatric disease is not of much value. A 
dynamic approach is needed. In a recent report, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences has advocated a knowledge 
network for biomedical research as a base from which 
to build a dynamic taxonomy of diseases.5 Psychiatric 
research has entered, just like the rest of medicine, an 
inflection point where the data deluge is beginning to 
overwhelm our capacity to absorb, integrate, and uti-
lize knowledge. The growth of data-intensive biology 
and information technology developments have gener-
ated an exciting opportunity to improve the diagnosis 
and management of disease by developing a knowledge 
network, and a new taxonomy, that integrates biological 
and clinical information with outcome data to improve 
the lives of patients.5
 The compelling need is to improve the link between 
biology and the patient with their treatment and out-
come. This will require a new mindset on the part of 
stakeholders, funders, clinicians, and scientists. We have 
more than 20 000 genes in our genome, and countless 
numbers of these genes will have many disease-relevant 
mutations, just like the genes that we already know 
about.5 Even if only a fraction of these genes link to 
disease risk or treatment response, there is enormous 
potential to improve patient care, diagnosis, and man-
agement of disease. By integrating patient biology, their 
genome, microbiome, transcriptome, and metabolome 
with health information and outcome data a dynamic 
taxonomy can revolutionize health care.
 The framework committee, responsible for devel-
oping a new taxonomy, came up with a scenario that 
entails a common, integrated information network.5 At 
the center of the network is an Information Hub that 
contains up-to-date disease information on individual 
patients and is continuously updated by a wide set of 
new data emerging though the progression of routine 
health care. This is connected to emerging knowledge 
from basic and translational research, and serves three 
purposes: (i) generating a dynamic, adaptive taxonomic 
system; (ii) providing the foundation for novel diagnos-
tic techniques, treatments; and (iii) becoming a catalyst 
for basic discovery. Any data that emerge, and are vali-
dated, will be integrated into the taxonomy to improve 
diagnosis and treatment (Figure 7).5
 A concerted effort to develop such a knowledge 
framework and information hub is sorely needed. There 
are many barriers—ranging from handling patient-level 
data, privacy, and unwillingness to share—that need to 
be overcome in order to create a system that will en-
hance health care. A simple clinical information hub 
that has been built at Duke University, North Carolina, 



















Novel dignostics and 
treatments
Taxonomy
Figure 7.  Evolution of illness from childhood, combining environment 
and genetic factors.
Figure 8.  Overview of the vision of the integrated information net-
work laid out by the framework committee, who were re-
sponsible for developing a new taxonomy of disease. Oval 
shapes are outputs, while circles are both input and outputs.
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to different options. Even without biological data, the 
system is already showing the predictive power of large 
data sets. The time for static taxonomy based on con-
sensus should come to an end and a dynamic system, as 
portrayed by the National Academy of Sciences report, 
should be built.5  o
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Una red de conocimiento para una taxonomía 
dinámica de las enfermedades psiquiátricas
Los enfoques taxonómicos actuales tanto en medicina 
como en psiquiatría son limitados en validez y utilidad. 
Ellos sirven para fines de una comunicación simple en la 
codificación médica, la enseñanza y el reembolso, pero 
no se adaptan a la era moderna con su rápida explo-
sión del conocimiento a partir de la revolución de los 
“ómicos”. La Academia Nacional de Ciencias publicó un 
informe titulado: “Hacia la Precisión en Medicina: Cons-
truyendo una Red de Conocimiento para Investigación 
Biomédica y una nueva Taxonomía de la Enfermedad”. 
Los autores abogan por una nueva taxonomía que pueda 
integrar datos moleculares, información clínica y resul-
tados terapéuticos de una manera dinámica y repetida, 
reuniendo investigación, salud pública y la prestación de 
cuidados de salud, con los objetivos interrelacionados de 
avanzar en nuestra comprensión de la patogénesis de la 
enfermedad y así mejorar la salud. Esta propuesta merece 
consideración, ya que es vital y oportuna la necesidad de 
un centro de información y de una red de conocimiento 
con una taxonomía dinámica basada en la integración de 
datos clínicos y de investigación.   
Un réseau de connaissance pour une taxonomie 
dynamique des maladies psychiatriques
Les stratégies taxonomiques actuelles en médecine et 
en psychiatrie sont limitées en validité et en utilité. Elles 
servent des objectifs simples de communication pour le co-
dage médical, l’enseignement et le remboursement, mais 
ne conviennent pas à l’époque contemporaine avec son 
explosion rapide de connaissance issue de la révolution « 
omics ». L’Académie Nationale des Sciences aux États-Unis 
a publié un rapport intitulé « Vers une médecine de pré-
cision : Construire un réseau de connaissance pour la re-
cherche biomédicale et une nouvelle taxonomie de la ma-
ladie.» Les auteurs prônent une nouvelle taxonomie qui 
intégrerait des données moléculaires, cliniques et des ré-
sultats des thérapeutiques de façon dynamique, itérative, 
en rassemblant la recherche, la santé publique et les pres-
tations de soins avec des objectifs interdépendants visant 
à faire progresser notre compréhension de la pathogenèse 
de la maladie et donc à améliorer la santé. Le besoin d’un 
centre d’information et d’un réseau de connaissance doté 
d’une taxonomie dynamique fondée sur l’intégration de 
données cliniques et de recherche étant vital et opportun, 
cette suggestion mérite d’être examinée.
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